Democratic Public Discourse in the Coming  Autarchic Communities by Gheorghe-Ilie Farte
META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
  386 
 
 
META: RESEARCH IN HERMENEUTICS, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY 
VOL. II, NO. 2 / 2010: 386-409, ISSN 2067-3655, www.metajournal.org 
 
 
 
Democratic Public Discourse in the Coming 
Autarchic Communities 
 
Gheorghe-Ilie Farte 
Al.I. Cuza University of Iasi 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The main purpose of this article is to tackle the problem of living together – as 
dignified human beings – in a certain territory in the field of social 
philosophy, on the theoretical grounding ensured by some remarkable 
exponents of the Austrian School − and by means of the praxeologic method. 
Because political tools diminish the human nature not only of those who use 
them, but also of those who undergo their effects, people can live a life worthy 
of a human being only as members of some autarchic or self-governing 
communities. As a spontaneous order, every autarchic community is 
inherently democratic, inasmuch as it makes possible free involvement, 
peaceful coordination, free expression and the free reproduction of ideas. The 
members of autarchic communities are moral individuals who avoid 
aggression, practice self-control, seek a dynamical efficiency and establish 
(together with their fellow human beings) a democratic public discourse. 
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Agreeing with Winston Churchill’s famous dictum “Democracy 
is the worst form of government, except for all those other 
forms that have been tried from time to time”, the 
overwhelming majority of public voices within the Euro-
Atlantic area (career politicians and prominent voters, 
academic political scientists and political commentators, 
mainstream journalists, philosophers and other opinion 
leaders) claim that democracy is the only acceptable form of 
political ruling and organization of a society, but also a panacea 
for all the diseases third-world peoples suffer from: wars, Gheorghe-Ilie Farte / Democratic public discourse in the coming autarchic communities 
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tyranny, corruption, exploitation, (grinding) poverty, (racial and 
ethnic, sexual and gender, religious, age, caste, employment, 
language, disability,...) discrimination, environmental crimes 
etc. (Minogue 2010). On the other hand, the same voices state, 
lament or even denounce the fact that an increasing number of 
citizens choose not to get involved in the political life and that 
they prefer – as cynical observers – to criticize harshly and 
scorn those who participate in the ruling of society and who 
usually carry out their tasks lamentably. Inasmuch as the 
supposed basic components of the so-called “ruling of the 
people, by the people, for the people” – the sovereignty of the 
people, the separation of powers, the human rights protection, 
the equality before the law, the limitation of government power 
to interfere in the lives of people or communities, the majority 
rule in decision making, the protection of minority rights, the 
open debates on public projects, etc. − seem not to have been 
understood, appreciated and fructified well enough by the 
public, the political pundits exhort the communities to adopt 
various forms of democracy (anticipatory democracy, direct 
democracy, demarchy / lottocracy, deliberative / discursive 
democracy, e-democracy, grassroots democracy, interactive 
democracy, participatory democracy, radical democracy, etc.), to 
stimulate or to facilitate everyone’s involvement in political 
discussions and debates and, as a last resort, to accept political 
participation being compulsory, at least in the case of exercising 
the right to vote.  
For most people it is highly plausible that: (a) the withdrawal of 
public participation is a major indicator of the erosion of 
democratic society (Nader 2004, 20), (b) the rich, powerful, well-
connected, and intolerant members of a society tend to establish 
an elitist democracy, using the democratic institutions and 
procedures to concentrate wealth and power in their hands 
(Nylen 2003, 4), (c) the enhancement of democracy occurs only 
through a continuous and dynamic process of democratization 
of democracy (Vitale 2006, 753), (d) a true democracy is a 
communicative one, so that citizens should have formal access 
to both indoor and outdoor spaces for the staging of public 
events aimed at calling attention to issues, expressing opinions, 
and calling for action (Young 2002, 169), and (e) legal duty to META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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vote may be necessary to protect the right to vote for vulnerable 
minorities or to gain support for a system of proportional 
representation that is fair to all racial, ethnic or religious 
groups (Lever 2008, 35). Without questioning the relevance of 
such statements and the good faith of those who advocate them, 
we consider, however, that the problem of living together in a 
certain territory is often imprecisely formulated and 
fallaciously grounded. On the one hand, there are no specified 
limits of the population having to live, work and act together, or 
attributes of the type of cohabitation this population considers 
convenient (values, goals, processes and relations inside and 
between communities etc.). On the other hand, there is no 
indication of any theoretical frame or methodological 
instruments which together guarantee the reliability of our 
knowledge on the problem in question. Unconcerned with the 
validity of increasing knowledge, many authors formulate 
contingent propositions starting from (unexpressed) 
questionable assumptions (e.g. “The progressive politicization of 
communities is necessary and desirable, as concerns collective 
issues and actions, as well as individuals’ private lives”) or 
normative propositions directed towards goals groundlessly 
considered to be both feasible and universally accepted (e.g. 
“One has to look for the most democratic form of a society’s 
political organization and the most effective means to involve a 
population in its practice, in order to make political tools and 
actions as useful, legitimate and reasonable as possible”). 
In order to surpass these shortcomings, we will discuss the 
problem of cohabitation in a public space appropriate for 
human nature in the field of social philosophy, on the 
theoretical grounding ensured by some remarkable exponents 
of the Austrian School – Ludwig von Mises (1998), Albert Jay 
Nock (1936; 1950), Frank Chodorov (1959), Robert LeFevre 
(1966; 1976; 1977), Murray Rothbard (2006; 2009), Hans-
Hermann Hoppe (1995; 2001), Jesús Huerta de Soto (2009) etc. 
− and by means of the praxeologic method (von Mises 1998; 
Rothbard 1976; Hoppe 2001). More precisely, we intend to 
formulate valid knowledge items about the way some 
individuals come to live together in self-governing communities 
by means of establishing a democratic public discourse, in the Gheorghe-Ilie Farte / Democratic public discourse in the coming autarchic communities 
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shape of a priori synthetic propositions about necessary facts 
and relations. These propositions can be obtained by means of 
the intellectual apprehension or comprehension of the nature of 
things, and their validity does not depend on historical 
experience. (Hoppe 2001, xv) Therefore, we will not attempt to 
validate – by means of a collection of factual data − some 
hypothetical propositions (like “Citizens’ jury creates an 
informed public opinion about what they feel policy makers 
should do”, “Longer education in public schools will lead to 
higher productivity”, “Employees are not capable to cover their 
illness risk” etc.), because they stand for contingent state of 
affairs and, as such, need to be permanently reevaluated. 
Contingent propositions do not further valid knowledge and do 
not deserve to be valued greatly not even in the social sciences. 
However, we will not try to generate practical items of 
knowledge, as they are inherently subjective, widely dispersed, 
changeable and often tacit. In correlation with the spontaneous 
or extended orders, practical knowledge does not help the 
knowing agent to generate a representation of the field under 
investigation because collecting and systematizing it is 
humanly impossible. Connected to unique life experiences, 
practical items of knowledge are unusable in the field of 
scientific or objective knowledge. Obviously they are useful to 
every individual in the context of using entrepreneurial 
creativity for increasing one’s prosperity. Practical knowledge is 
generated and fructified by individuals separately when they 
succeed or fail in the many social games in which they engage. 
Basically, the theoretical propositions we will derive hereafter 
are based on the following theses: (1) the bounds of any 
community are variable and impossible to legitimize by political 
means; (2) people have the (natural) right to live together as 
they believe to be right, on the one condition of observing the 
non-aggression principle; (3) political means are intrinsically 
evil because they diminish the human nature not only of those 
who use them, but also of those who undergo their effects; (4) 
people can live a life worthy of a human being only as members 
of some autarchic or self-governing communities; (5) every 
autarchic community is inherently democratic, but not in a 
political sense; (6) the members of autarchic communities are META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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moral individuals who avoid aggression, practice self-control, 
seek a dynamical efficiency and establish (together with their 
fellow human beings) a democratic public discourse.  
 
Political communities, economic communities, affinity 
communities 
 
The term “community” is associated with so many and so 
diverse adjectival phrases − black, Baptist, atheist, Romanian, 
Kiev Jewish, international, business, academic, scientific, 
libertarian, fishing, beer-drinking, Romanian facebook, online 
gothic, Internet cannibal, etc. – that the only fitting definition 
is that of a group of interacting people that live or grow 
together. Either in the real world, or in cyberspace, people use 
race, religion, nationality, ethnicity, region, occupation, 
worldview, interests, hobbies, fantasies, etc. to affiliate and 
work together with their fellow men.  
The countless and manifold human communities can be 
grouped in three categories, depending on the following four 
criteria: (a) the regulatory principle, (b) the essential resources, 
(c) the specific feedback and (d) the fundamental values. 
 
 
  Political 
communities 
Economic 
communities 
Affinity 
communities 
Regulatory 
principle 
government/ 
state 
market tradition 
Essential 
resources 
command money  gift 
Feedback  reward vs. 
punishment 
profit vs. loss  integration vs. 
isolation 
Fundamental 
values 
justice / equity  efficiency / 
productivity 
charity / 
solidarity 
 
1. Types of human communities 
 
Political communities are delimited by the state by means of 
commands, i.e., through prescriptions establishing – by force or 
by threats of using force − a certain ratio of forces between Gheorghe-Ilie Farte / Democratic public discourse in the coming autarchic communities 
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individuals, groups or social classes, a certain mechanism to 
redistribute wealth and a certain path of evolution for social 
order. In democratically organized political communities, the 
commands are called laws and are declaratively grounded on 
the value of justice (or equity); they establish rewards for those 
who observe the instituted social order and sanctions for those 
who transgress it.  
The term “state” is surrounded by a halo of connotations, so 
that the definition one professes – however descriptive and 
axiologically neutral – reveals a certain philosophy of life and a 
certain perspective on society. Thus, people who are actively 
involved in government and as such are more aware of the 
advantages than of the disadvantages are inclined to consider 
the state being made up of the territory and the population on 
which this organization exerts its authority. Conversely, people 
who dislike political means and are more preoccupied by the 
fact that their freedom to follow (peacefully) their own path to 
happiness is restricted and that they are deprived (through 
taxes and contributions) of the fruits of their labor consider the 
state to be only a component part of society. Those who – out of 
fear or shame – avoid assuming responsibility for using political 
means tend to consider the state an impersonal structure, made 
up of institutions, authorities and other abstract entities. 
Contrariwise, those who value personal autonomy treat the 
state as an ensemble of individuals who are responsible 
individually and collectively for every activity where political 
means are used. Finally, people who wallow in a “praxeological 
myopia” tend to accept the modification (i.e. the extension) of 
the state domain, on the one condition of profiting – in the short 
run – from certain positive effects, whatever the negative short 
term consequences on other categories of individuals or long 
term effects on the whole of society and whatever the immoral 
political means. By contrast, individuals with a vision and an 
acute sense of individual and collective responsibility tend to 
concentrate on the fairness of the intended goals and the 
honesty of the means chosen to attain them. In the light of 
these specifications, we subscribe to the definitions of the 
concept of state given by libertarian thinkers, such as the sound 
observation of Franz Oppenheimer that the state “is a social META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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institution, forced by a victorious group of men on a defeated 
group, with the sole purpose of regulating the dominion of the 
victorious group over the vanquished, and securing itself 
against revolt from within and attacks from abroad“. 
(Oppenheimer 1926, 18) Thus, for Hans-Herman Hoppe, the 
government is “a territorial monopolist of compulsion – an 
agency which may engage in continual, institutionalized 
property rights violations and the exploitation – in the form of 
expropriation, taxation and regulation – of private property 
owners.” (Hoppe 1995, 94) In a similar manner, Murray N. 
Rothbard said that the state is “that organization in society 
which attempts to maintain a monopoly of the use of force and 
violence in a given territorial area; in particular, it is the only 
organization in society that obtains its revenue not by 
voluntary contribution or payment for services rendered but by 
coercion.” (Rothbard 2009, 1) 
The following implications can be derived from the definitions 
above: (a) the state is an element apart of any society, so that 
not even a totalitarian state coincides with the society it 
governs; (b) the state is not an abstract entity, but an ensemble 
of individuals, who are individually and collectively responsible 
for their actions; (c) the state holds the compulsory monopoly to 
use force proactively for obtaining the resources necessary for it 
to function, as well as for establishing rules of conduct for the 
whole society; (d) the sphere of action of the democratic state is 
confined by the eminently public nature of both transacted 
goods and services and of the social environment where the 
goods are created and distributed.  
Economic communities are shaped out by voluntary exchanges 
of private goods and are governed by market laws (especially 
those of supply and demand). Economic transactions are 
lubricated by the most marketable commodity – money – and 
the people involved in them are motivated by the will to 
maximize their profits and to reduce or even eradicate losses. 
The fundamental value of economic activities is efficiency or 
productivity. The market is a very democratic regulatory 
mechanism, as all those who possess the specific systemic 
resource – money – are free to obtain the goods they want and 
to enjoy them exclusively. The market establishes no artificial Gheorghe-Ilie Farte / Democratic public discourse in the coming autarchic communities 
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barrier (such as origin, intelligence, education, profession, or 
high moral values) between the consumer and the desired 
product. And yet the market discourages those who are 
unproductive and ineffective in consuming scarce products, 
coveted more by those both productive and efficient. The 
quantity and quality of private goods transacted on the market, 
and the exclusivity of those goods makes the effort of acquiring 
them take place in a climate marked by envy, rivalry and 
competition.  
The affinity communities are governed by the regulatory 
mechanism of tradition, the essential resource is the gift (or 
gratuitous help), feedback takes the shape of integration or 
isolation of social agents, and the fundamental values of action 
are charity and solidarity. Viewed as an ensemble of heritages, 
conceptions, myths, legends, superstitions, customs, beliefs, etc. 
passed on from one generation to the next, tradition fashions – 
in a narrow – the behaviors of the individuals involved in 
various voluntary associations: families, parishes, clubs, (sport, 
charity, neighbors’) clubs, think tanks, etc. Gratuitous help 
strengthens personal virtues, decreases the cost of living and 
increases the community’s cohesion. Affinity communities are 
favorable environments for learning self-rule, inhibiting 
aggressive tendencies and voluntary coordinating efforts in 
collective projects.  
Political, economic and affinity communities are intrinsically 
variable. Throughout time, they ceaselessly change their 
composition, values, interpersonal processes and relations, 
territory, etc. Interestingly enough, the variability is 
unanimously recognized and accepted in economic and affinity 
communities, but is denied or abusively interpreted by political 
communities. Nobody is surprised when a joint venture is 
ended, a rental contract is canceled, a married couple divorces, 
a religious denomination suffers a schism, a charity changes its 
target audience, etc. without violent conflicts. It seems to be 
axiomatic that no one needs to use violence in order to associate 
with or dissociate from someone. Obviously, this does not mean 
that there is no resentment or non-canceled manifestation of 
discontent: avoidance, defamation, discrimination, boycott, etc. 
However, in the case of political communities, state agencies META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
  394 
 
 
invoke the argument of legitimacy to maintain or extend – by 
force or by threats of using force − a certain territory. Thus, 
variability is accepted only in the sense of augmentation, in no 
case in that of diminution. But neither language, religion, nor 
the past justifies incorporating individuals or groups in a 
political community despite their will. Besides, history confirms 
the contingency of all political communities (gilgtc 2007). A 
state agency does not control a certain territory thanks to the 
legitimacy of its borders, but by its political force.  
By choosing freely to integrate peacefully in certain 
communities or to leave others, each person looks for his own 
path to happiness, appreciating subjectively the benefits 
derived from taking decisions. The only legitimate thing in this 
context is precisely everyone’s freedom to live together with 
other people in those communities he considers adequate to his 
aspirations.  
 
The non-aggression axiom as golden mean 
 
Whatever the political, economic or affinity communities they 
are involved in, all individuals relate (implicitly or explicitly) to 
the libertarian non-aggression principle, living their life in 
strict accordance with the logical implications of the position 
they adopt. The non-aggression axiom asserts that aggression is 
inherently illegitimate, that is to say, the initiation of physical 
force against persons or property, the threat of such, or fraud 
upon persons or their property is unjustified under any 
circumstances. Since reason is the essential human trait, it is 
necessary for all of us to deal with other people through 
reasoning and persuasion rather than violence and coercion. 
(Wiebe 2010) We should keep in mind, however, that the non-
aggression principle forbids the initiation of (physical) violence, 
and not any use of force. To deal with others through force is to 
act in a subhuman manner, like a beast of prey; but refusing to 
use force against aggressors is to act in a superhuman way, like 
a saint. The non-aggression principle can be seen as striking an 
appropriate balance – a Golden Mean – between subhuman 
aggression and superhuman pacifism. (Long 1999, 123-124) As 
upholders of the non-aggression axiom, libertarians abstain Gheorghe-Ilie Farte / Democratic public discourse in the coming autarchic communities 
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from initiating force, but can resort to violence to protect 
themselves from aggressors. 
The people who relinquish violence as means of regulating 
social relations progressively learn to practice self-control by 
tempering their affects, drives, passions, thoughts, etc. which 
can make them appear as aggressors to their fellow men. 
Preoccupied to rule themselves, they usually have no interest in 
ruling others. (By contrast, those who make no effort to control 
themselves tend to govern other people arbitrarily.) As they 
have only their reason and persuasion to obtain what they want 
from the members of the community they are part of, 
libertarians are forced to pursue only reasonable and generally 
acceptable goals. Governed by the quid pro quo principle, they 
act so that the desired results – due to the added value they 
create – are appreciated and desired by their fellow men. The 
non-aggression principle inspires the love of liberty. Those who 
do not try to appropriate (by means of molestation and 
spoliation) the fruit of other peoples’ labor can only attain their 
goals by freely using their faculties and resources. Convinced of 
the benefits of the freedom to accomplish personal objectives by 
fully using one’s capabilities, they grant freedom a universal 
value, more so as they accept the Kantian maxim that the 
human being is always a purpose, not a means. Individuals who 
acknowledge the freedom they enjoy develop an acute sense of 
responsibility and take on obligations in relation to the 
consequences of their actions. Self-control, consideration for the 
life and property of the others, the commitment to offer value 
for value, the love of freedom and the high level of 
responsibility prove to be indispensable moral ingredients in 
the fight against mass values. The mass man can be found in a 
position of leadership in the church, in business, in the 
classroom, on the farm, in government and all committee-type 
organizations. He lives by a double standard of morality; more 
exactly, he acts in the mass (collective, committee, commission, 
organization, etc.) in a manner inferior to the way he acts on 
his own responsibility. (Read 1962, 50) By developing a unitary 
personality, the true libertarian is the exact opposite of the 
mass man. He always manifests himself as a factor of organic 
growth of the communities he is part of.  META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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The traits of the people who prefer to acquire the goods they 
desire by means of coercion are obviously contrary to the 
libertarians’ attributes: (a) instead of practicing self-control, 
they strive to control the others; (b) by choosing the status of 
predator instead of producer, they systematically engage in 
infringing on the life, liberty and property of their neighbors; (c) 
not being engaged in voluntary goods exchange, they have no 
consideration for the value for value principle; (d) because they 
do not need freedom to fructify their faculties and resources, 
they interact with other people based on the relationship 
master-slave; (e) in the absence of freedom, they behave 
irresponsibly, at most accepting the idea of social responsibility; 
(f) in most interaction situations within a community, they 
apply double moral standards.  
Essentially, the non-aggression principle is trespassed by two 
categories of individuals: the villains (thieves, bullies, 
criminals, procurers, rapists, etc.) and the statists (politicians, 
lobbyists, voters, sinecurists, etc.). The former frankly admit 
the violent and immoral nature of their means, whereas the 
latter insist on the so-called legitimate nature of the coercive 
actions they perform. Although engaging in a milder form of 
aggression, politicians – reunited in a political agency – 
radically debase the life of all human communities. Thus, for 
economic communities, the state agency turns into a population 
poverty factor, because it (a) reduces the financial capital 
accessible to entrepreneurs (by increasing public debt), (b) 
turns the workforce from directly productive activities (by 
increasing corruption), (c) generally restricts market resources 
(by taxation), (d) penalizes the frugality, prudence and future 
planning of some of people (through inflation), (e) disorients 
entrepreneurs (through preferential credit, tax exemptions, 
bonuses, overtaxing, excises, etc. ), (f) hampers the equilibrium 
of supply and demand (by restricting “excessive” profits), (g) 
hinders the optimal occupation of the workforce (by 
guarantying minimum wages and taxing work), (h) makes 
certain goods or services scarce and inaccessible (through 
monopoly policies and administered prices), (i) disorients 
consumers (through stimulating programs like “The Clunker”, 
“The First Home”, etc.), by making them buy goods they do not Gheorghe-Ilie Farte / Democratic public discourse in the coming autarchic communities 
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need or that exceed their level of productivity at unfair prices, 
(j) exacerbates the consumers’ expectancies (by proclaiming a 
so-called welfare right), so that many people take on a much too 
high life standard, to the detriment of the future generations, 
etc. (Farte 2010, 116) When intervening in the affinity 
communities, the state agency dissocializes, alters the maturing 
process of individuals and hampers the learning of virtues. 
Thus, the “generous” social assistance services have reduced 
the economic and mutual aid functions of the family, parish and 
local community. The decay of domestic economy and taking 
care of the elders by the state made children undesirable, as 
can be seen by the proliferation of contraceptive practices (and 
accepting the most inhumane form of contraception, abortion, 
as something natural). Consequently, the institution of 
marriage became superfluous, because in the absence of 
children, adults no longer need a home and a special form of 
solidarity. Without fertile conjugal relations, the partners are 
no longer bound to mutual fidelity and have no sufficient 
motivation to build an exclusive lifelong partnership. The 
state’s paternalism discourages young people to take on the 
responsibilities of adulthood, as can be seen in prolonged 
schooling (often continuing after 30 years of age). If the state 
did not make private life problems public (education, working 
place, family, income source, health, etc.), people would take 
their lives into their own hands sooner and would not wait for 
certain “political commissioners” to take care of their personal 
problems. (Farte 2010, 116-117) 
Examining the consequences of observing versus violating the 
non-aggression principle, we may say that true libertarians 
have a natural right to live together in various communities as 
they see fit, as long as the rules of action they follow necessarily 
generate benefits and do not prejudice the others. On the other 
hand, those who disregard the non-aggression axiom affect the 
welfare of other people whatever the communities they are part 
of, the goals they pursue and the justifications they bring to 
support their actions. 
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Are political means intrinsically evil? 
 
Yes, they are. Political means are necessarily incongruous with 
legitimacy, rationality and utility, even if used by a democratic 
government.  
The lack of legitimacy characterizes the agents of political 
actions, the desired political goals and the range of applicability 
of political means. Basically, any action that violates the non-
aggression axiom is illegitimate, but for the sake of the 
argument, we could accept individual and collective self-binding 
actions as legitimate. Democratic states seem to be in the latter 
case, as they affirm that society is self-governed (or self-
controlled), either directly, by referendum, or indirectly, 
through its representative institutions. Yet no society has ever 
been fully validly represented. For example, the report on the 
final results of the elections for the Chamber of Deputies on the 
30th of November 2008 indicate that the entire Romanian 
people (roughly 21,500,000 people) was not called to choose its 
political representatives, but only 85% of its members (that is 
18,464,274), who were on the electoral lists. Out of these, only 
6,886,794 (about 32% of the total population of Romania) 
manifested their sovereignty by valid votes, and the parties 
that exert the political power in the name of the sovereign 
people (The Liberal-Democrat Party and The Magyar 
Democratic Union of Romania) were delegated by 2,653,868 
voters (representing 12. 34% of the population of Romania). 
(BEC 2008) Under these conditions, the representativeness of 
the Romanian government is no better legitimized than an 
oligarchy or a monarchy. The difference is more one of degree 
rather than nature. In relation to the objectives pursued, 
legitimacy seems to derive from the agreement of the members 
of the community regarding their pertinence. The question 
remains however as to whether the objectives of political 
actions are legitimized by the number of persons who approve 
them and whether the circumstances of reaching majority are 
correctly defined. The majority may be wrong about the 
pertinence of an objective as well as an individual, and what 
the majority approves of on a regional scale may be rejected by 
the majority on a national or, why not, global scale. Who can Gheorghe-Ilie Farte / Democratic public discourse in the coming autarchic communities 
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decide in what context the public support of the majority needs 
to be acquired? As to the delimitation of the community a state 
agency is allowed to govern, we think it is practically impossible 
to find irrefutable criteria. The “cemetery of states” history 
shows us proves the fact that any government temporarily 
controls the greatest possible community in rapport with the 
political means it commands. Race, nationality, language, 
religion or economic infrastructure are not factors of legitimacy 
for state borders. All the states are doomed to have variable 
borders and, finally, to disappear.  
Political means are unsuitable also because of the shortage of 
rationality of the actions undertaken. The advocates of 
participative democracy remind us of H. L. Mencken’s pithy 
remark that “democracy is the pathetic belief in the collective 
wisdom of individual ignorance” (cf. Caplan 2007, 3), by their 
enthusiasm with “the miracle of the [fortunate] aggregation of 
votes”, i.e., with the fact that the number of well-informed 
citizens in a society does not influence significantly the result of 
the election. In other words, it does not really matter if the 
average citizen’s level of political knowledge is extraordinarily 
low, because democracy can function well under almost any 
magnitude of voter ignorance. It follows that as long as 
ignorant people are not systematically mistaken, their 
individual votes do not radically influence the result of the vote. 
Unfortunately, as Bryan Caplan noticed, many citizens who 
exercise their right to vote are not humble agnostics, but self-
important ignoramuses, who let prejudices deeply rooted in the 
collective consciousness hold sway over their actions. Moreover, 
these biases, prejudices, stereotypes, myths, etc. are speculated 
in electoral campaigns to create conditioned reflexes in the 
voters’ ranks.  
The pernicious nature of political means is also highlighted by 
their uselessness. The goods or services that politicians offer do 
not abide by the law of universality and do not rise to the level 
of quality desired by citizens. In addition, their distribution by 
the citizens invariably gives rise to discontent, whatever the 
variant. First of all, it is practically impossible for a political 
agency to estimate correctly the needs, desires or expectations 
of each citizen, not to mention their respective degrees of META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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urgency or importance. On the market, the intensity of the 
consumers’ desire to have a product is accurately reflected in its 
price. Yet in the political sphere (where the monopoly of 
legitimate violence is at work) there are no free prices, but more 
or less arbitrary costs. Secondly, politicians are not motivated 
to estimate correctly the needs, desires or wants of each citizen 
as long as they are in the situation – correctly and ingeniously 
presented by Milton Friedman – of spending other people’s 
money for other people. (cf. Sidewinder77 2009) If they do not 
assess correctly the consumers’ demands, businessmen go 
bankrupt, lose their capital and exit the market, whereas if 
they do not estimate accurately the citizens’ interests, 
politicians lose nothing of their own resources and often not 
even their political influence. Thirdly, the members of the state 
agency cannot offer goods and services according to the specifics 
in electoral, and then government program. The need to 
persuade an electorate that is increasingly unpredictable, 
greedy and squeamish pushes the politicians to promise on the 
one hand, an increasing quantity and quality of goods and 
public services, and decreasing taxes, on the other. But such a 
promise is obviously contradictory. Politicians are doomed to 
offer less than they promised, i.e., to cheat the citizens’ 
expectations, not nearly to satisfy (or surpass them). Finally, as 
Robert Higgs (2009) well noticed, the diversity of the citizens’ 
values, convictions and interests makes formulating a 
unanimously accepted solution practically impossible, even 
when there is a consensus on one problem. Especially in a socio-
economic context, someone’s problem may be someone else’s 
solution. For example, the raise of contributions to the social 
insurance fund has negative effects on both employees and 
employers, but ensures the pensions of the elderly. What 
dissatisfies some reassure the others. Moreover, even in the 
same category there are different degrees of content and 
discontent. For example, the same quantum of the building tax 
makes some tax payers mutter in discontent, while bringing 
others to despair, pushing them to actions of fiscal 
disobedience.  
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By means of democratic public discourse to autarchic 
communities 
 
It has become a commonplace that man is an imperfect being 
that lives in an imperfect world. All human beings are (at least 
partially) dissatisfied with the state of affairs they are in, 
perceive the scantiness and frailty of their knowledge of reality 
and are confronted with the scarcity of their (material, 
intellectual or spiritual) resources when acting to reach certain 
goals. Furthermore, the higher the level of civilization, the 
more acutely the vulnerability is perceived. Our ancestors 
bravely endured terrible calamities, like the plague, famine, 
religious persecutions or wars, while we whine when 
confronting a power cut, an Internet connection outage, a waste 
collectors’ strike or a cut in children’s allowance. Some time 
ago, a farmer could build his home all by himself; nowadays a 
teacher cannot make a writing instrument. Each step onwards 
on the path of civilization makes us more vulnerable and 
dependent on the cooperation of our fellow human beings.  
Unfortunately, humans are not only marked by discomforts, but 
also prone to evil. From birth till death they are tempted to 
commit offences or sins against their neighbors (e.g. gossip, 
calumny, theft, adultery, rape, murder, etc.), as well as against 
themselves (e.g. alcoholism, drug addiction, masturbation, self-
mutilation, suicide, etc.). Whatever the cause of this penchant 
to evil – ignorance, original sin, defects of social order, etc. –, it 
is obvious that without self-control or social control temptation 
turns into deed. Thus, in order to reach the goals by which we 
hope to improve our life and in order to resist the temptation to 
harm, we are bound to live together with our fellow men in a 
community, in accordance to certain principles and rules of 
behavior. 
Despite of repeated failures throughout the history of 
humanity, the version of cohabitation in political communities 
is still appealing. Those who continuously experience the 
hardships of life, the scarcity of relevant information, the lack 
of perspective, the dearth of resources and the malice of their 
fellow men are tempted to accept that there may be an 
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all their problems. But no individual or collective agency can 
organize the myriads of relevant items of information so as to 
create a social design convenient for all the members of society, 
more so as the relevance of information depends on their 
strictly subjective preferences. For example, is it plausible for 
the Romanian state to have relevant information on the 
problems I consider priorities? And as long as the Romanian 
state is not preoccupied in acquiring this information, can 
anyone say it is acting in my best interest? Then, even if an 
agency had access to all the relevant information regarding all 
the members of the society, it still could not solve their 
problems, lacking the necessary means. To go even further, 
supposing it had the necessary resources to attain all goals, 
there is still a rare resource remaining, which prevents the 
actualization of the earthly Paradise, namely time. As long as 
reaching all goals must be stretched over time, the political 
agency that is to solve everybody’s problems will end up 
creating privileged people and losers, with the latter having to 
wait the fulfillment of the former. Last, but not least, once we 
accept the universality of human malice – at least under the 
form of inclination or temptation −, can we imagine that the 
members of the political agencies are pure or at least that they 
are recruited from the ranks of the most moral members of 
society? Unfortunately, we can say that things are exactly the 
opposite. Decent people strongly believe they cannot accomplish 
good things by initiating aggression, more so as they know the 
information they detain is fatally insufficient. If the Son of God 
presented the Gospel as a proposal, who is he so bold as to 
affirm that grounded on insufficient information and using 
violence he is doing the work of the Lord? If it is difficult to 
protect ourselves from the aggression of villains, how much 
harder is it to defend ourselves from aggression considered to 
be legitimate.  
A convenient alternative for the beings that lack omniscience, 
omnipotence and innocence is abandoning social engineering 
projects for self-organizing systems. If the social order 
strategically imposed by “experts” is necessarily dissatisfying 
and abusively imposed (at least for some members of society), 
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common law, customs, language, science, the Internet, etc. – is 
voluntarily accepted and held as beneficial by all persons 
involved. (diZerega 1989; 2004) It is obvious for everyone that 
those who decide to sell or buy anything on the market do it of 
their will, and not pressured by an external agency. Moreover, 
sellers and buyers alike are satisfied by the results of the 
transactions carried out, at least at the moment of its 
completion. Were they not convinced they were receiving the 
desired benefit, they would be free to refuse the transaction, as 
in many other situations. Interestingly enough, the 
spontaneous order reclaims no altruism, self sacrifice, thorough 
knowledge of reality or high moral standard. Coming back to 
the spontaneous order of the market, it is obvious that the 
seller and the buyer act in their own interest. When I buy a loaf 
of bread for 1.50 lei from the baker, I think it is worth more 
than 1.50 lei, and the baker, less. Besides, altruism in 
commercial transactions would be detrimental, as it would 
distort the feedback of the market and would trigger a 
misallocation of resources (necessarily rare, as said before). 
Then, not all the persons involved in the spontaneous order of 
the market always make the best decisions. Pressured by time, 
buyers and sellers resort to all the simplifiers of information 
available to them (commercials, presentation material, 
journalistic articles, word-of-mouth, posts on forums and online 
social networks, etc.) and take the risk of a decision partially 
and subjectively grounded. Yet, even when they fail (talking of 
failure “not objectively”, but from their own point of view), they 
still have the advantage of an honest feedback that will help 
them in future decision making. Finally, the market is a truly 
democratic institution, as every participant matters as a 
normal rational agent. The saying “Our client, our master!” 
illustrates how important every customer is for the seller, 
whatever the volume of sales. When the market of a product 
drops by a tenth, sellers become worried and take action to 
retrieve their loss. When the number of voters is just larger 
than a third of the total number of electors, the political class 
does not even comment on the fact. Where is democracy to be 
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The spontaneous order shows its virtues not only on the 
market, but also in communication. The language of a 
community is the result of the innumerable semiotic 
interactions performed by a population throughout its history. 
Nobody can claim to be its owner, control it or prevent its use in 
various language games. Unsurprisingly, the enemies of the 
spontaneous order – the political agencies – seek to control the 
media of communication as they try to regulate the markets. In 
societies considered to be democratic, censorship is less obvious 
because many discover that one can criticize and even slander 
anybody without being harmed. Few notice, however, that the 
political agency is ruthless to those who express points of view 
that can undermine its power. The Julian Assange – Wikileaks 
case is a perfect illustration of the severity with which actual 
free expression is repressed. (According to some sources, out of 
the 251,287 documents representing mail between the State 
Department of the United States of America and certain 
American embassies all over the world, only 15,000 were 
classified. What would the sanction have been had all 
documents been classified?)  
Fortunately, however fierce the censorship some political 
agencies exercise, public discourse – as an ensemble of 
messages used to create a space of openness, transparency, 
evaluation and emergence of natural rules – is a haven of 
freedom and voluntary cooperation, if not for the masses, then 
for the supporters of the non-aggression principle. In the last 
resort, ideas are indestructible and can be infinitely reproduced 
in peoples’ minds from one generation to the next. The new 
communication technologies – especially the Internet – give 
public discourse a truly democratic quality. Messages placed in 
the new media can reproduce virally and reach billions of 
computers and minds, so that no political agency in the world 
can control them. Every person sui generis involved in this 
public discourse matters as author, news retailers, 
commentators, continuators, etc. 
The market and public discourse (as institutions associated 
with the extended or spontaneous order), as well as affinity 
communities (as institutions associated with narrow order) can 
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who practice self-control and observe the non-aggression 
principle. Autarchic communities must not be associated with 
reservations, ghettos, Black Homelands, monasteries, etc.; in 
other words, they should not be looked upon as closed and 
isolated small communities of freaks. A community is 
characterized by the fact that its members live or develop 
together and share certain values, customs and interests. It is 
neither necessary, nor always desirable for the members of an 
autarchic community to live in the same territory. Geographical 
concentration makes autarchic communities vulnerable to 
agencies who initiate aggression. Moreover, departing from one 
of Albert Jay Nock’s ideas, we could add that it is not necessary 
for the members of an autarchic community to know each other 
(Nock 1936). It is important for them to be connected to a 
communicational infrastructure which would make possible 
free involvement, free expression and the free reproduction of 
ideas. Autarchic communities are transverse because they 
comprise supporters of the non-aggression principle belonging 
to more economic or affinity communities. (Personally, we 
believe that a self-consistent libertarian should not be involved 
in a political community not even as a voter. This point is very 
controversial. In the U.S.A. there is even a libertarian political 
party, which we consider to be a contradiction in terms.) Being 
always ready in times of crisis to help selflessly some members 
of his family, friends, neighbors, members of the parish he 
belong to etc., every libertarian acts in terms of their self-
interest as part of the spontaneous order. His welfare depends 
on the cultivation of their own entrepreneurial creativity and 
the coordination with his fellow men. Entrepreneurial 
creativity is the typically human ability to seek, discover, and 
overcome different social maladjustments, in other words, the 
capacity to recognize opportunities for proﬁt which appear in 
the environment and to act accordingly to take advantage of 
them. (de Soto 2009, 8-10) The risks they take give 
entrepreneurs the right to appropriate the results of their 
creativity. Deprived of the fruits of their entrepreneurial 
creativity (an always risky enterprise), entrepreneurs lose their 
motivation to repeat this kind of activities and society loses a 
vital agent of development. META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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Throughout the history of humankind, there has always been a 
remnant of humanity for which self-control, non-aggression, 
work, mutuality, liberty, responsibility and integrity were 
values indispensable to a life worthy of a human being. Aware 
of their own fallibility, they did not strive to create a perfect 
world, but to respect principles and rules capable to diminish 
injustice in the world. Autarchic communities do not try to 
change the world and do not seek to replace the power of 
political agencies by their own authority. They offer support 
and encouragement to those who refuse to aggress and govern 
their fellow men, preferring to control themselves. 
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